摘要
Inrecentyears,therearemanycrimesrelateddrugfraudoccuringinChinaandmanyexpertsthinkthatthemaincauseisthatChinaFoodandDrugAdministration(CFDA)adoptsannouncedinspection(AI).Inordertocircumventthisdifficulty,CFDAhasexploitedunannouncedinspection(UI)since2014.Inthispaper,theauthorsstudytheproblemofwhichoneperformsbetter,AIorUI.Specifically,theauthorsconsiderasupervisor,whichdecidestheinspectionapproach,inspectionstrengthandpunishmenttoforcethefirmtoputself-inspectionefforttomeettherequirementsofGoodManufacturingPractice,andafirm,whichproducesadruganddecidesitsself-inspectioneffort.Theauthorsusegametheorytomodelthisproblem,characterizetheequilibriumpoliciesunderAI,andcomparetheeffectsofthetwoapproachesonpreventingdrugfraudundercompleteandincompleteinformation.Theresultsshowthatunderthecompleteinformation,UIperformsbetterifthefirm'stechnicallevelandtheinspectioncostarelowandAIperformsbetterotherwise.Whenthesupervisordoesn'tknowthefirm'stechnicallevel,ifthelowtechnicallevelishigh,AIperformsbetter.Otherwise,UIperformsbetteriftheinspectioncostislowandAIperformsbetteriftheinspectioncostishigh.
出版日期
2018年06月16日（中国期刊网平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）
