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简介：Basedontheconceptofproductivecapitalstock,thispaperestimatedcapitalinputbythreeassettypesofChina’s36serviceindustriesin2003–2015,andcomparedwiththeresultsofwealthcapitalstock.Thisstudyfoundthatthewealthcapitalstockmethodunderestimatestheactualcapitalinputineachsectorinvaryingdegrees,anditmayinterferencetheaccuracyofproductivityevaluationinsectors.Accordingtothenewestimationresultsofcapitalinput,thispaperfurtherappliedfourstagesbootstrap-DEAmethodtoestimateindustrialproductivity,andcalculateditsconfidenceintervals.Thisstudyfoundthat,theyearsofeducationandtheaveragewagehaveasignificantpositiveimpactontheproductivityofserviceindustries;theproductiveserviceshaveashortboardeffectinthewholeserviceindustry.

简介：在瓷器革新驱动的发展策略下面，风险资本在城市的凝块集成和合作革新成为了一个重要驱动力。这份报纸使用社会网络分析为时期2005-2015在Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei城市的凝块分析风险资本的空间与时间的差别。一个严肃模型和面板数据回归模型被用来在这个区域在风险资本在空间与时间的差别上揭示影响因素。这研究发现在在北京的风险资本网络有某个轮转的变化和不平的区别--Tianjin-Hebei城市的凝块以全部的投资，并且风险资本(北京，Shijiazhuang和Tangshan)的三个中心在包围城市上有stimulatory效果；在城市之间的风险资本的流动显示某些联网规则，而是他们是慢的发展并且强烈向心；在信息基础结构开发和经济开发和风险资本投资的层次之间有强壮的积极关联；并且有相对不发达的金融环境和服务工业的地方不太能使用革新和entrepreneurship的水果并且吸引资金。这研究能在在中国与最好的革新能力造世界级的超级城市的凝块里为Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei城市的凝块充当一本参考书。

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简介：Investorsshouldalwaysargueaboutmanagementfeesbecauseoftheirimpactonnetperformancethatcanbesubstantial.Thisespeciallyforinvestments,likerealestate,whichrequireintensivemanagement.However,differentfromtraditionalmutualfundsthatareusuallyrelatedtothegrossvalueoftheassetsundermanagement,butsimilartootherfinancialindustrysectors(e.g.hedgefundsandprivateequityfunds),REITmanagers’compensationstructuretypicallyprovidesabasicallyfixedpaymentbasedalternativelyongrossassetvalue(GAV)ornetassetvalue(NAV).Inaddition,managersusuallyalsogainaperformancefee.ThepaperanalyseshowthetwoalternativecompensationschemesinfluenceREITs’investmentdecisionsandcapitalstructureand,consequently,REITs’sharevalueandperformance.Thefinalissueaddressediswhether—andunderwhichconditions—onecompensationschemeissuperiortotheother.Duetothe(usual)marketpricediscountonNAVs,bothfeestructuresincentivisemanagerstoleverage—eveninatax-freeenvironment—inordertomaximizethemanagementfees.However,theleveragemotivationisstrongerforGAV-basedthanforNAV-basedREITs,whicharealsoexpectedtobemoreselectiveininvestmentdecisions.Overall,consideringinitialfeepercentage,GAV-basedREITsareexpectedtoexecutehighermanagementfeesthanNAV-basedREITsduetotherelevantleverageeffect.Moreover,debtrecourseproducesdifferenteffectsonsharevalueifmeasureduponmarketpriceornetassetvalue.TheempiricalanalysisfocusesonpublicItalianREITs(2002-2012).Theresultsseemtosupportthetheoreticalexpectations.GAV-basedREITsexperiencehigherdebttrendsandlevelsthanNAV-basedREITs.Atthesametime,GAV-basedREITsregisterlowerrealestateassetreturnsgrossandnetofmanagementfeesforbothcurrentandgrowthyields.DifferencesinthereturnsleadtopermanenthigherperformancesovertotalreturnindexesofNAV-basedREITscomparedtoGAV-basedREITs.