Evolutionarygamedynamicsinfinitesizepopulationscanbedescribedbyafitness-dependentWrightFisherprocess.Weconsidersymmetric2x2gamesinawell-mixedpopulation.Inourmodel,twoparameterstodescribethelevelofplayer’srationalityandnoiseintensityinenvironmentareintroduced.Incontrastwiththefixationprobabilitymethodthatusedinanoiselesscase,theintroducingofthenoiseintensityparametermakestheprocessanergodicMarkovprocessandbasedonthelimitdistributionoftheprocess,wecananalysistheevolutionarystablestrategy(ESS)ofthegames.WeillustratetheeffectsofthetwoparametersontheESSofgamesusingthePrisoner’sdilemmagames(PDG)andthesnowdriftgames(SG).WealsocomparetheESSofourmodelwiththatofthereplicatordynamicsininfinitesizepopulations.Theresultsaredeterminedbysimulationexperiments.