简介:WiththedeepeningofelectricpowermarketreforminChina,themonopolyedgeofthestate-ownedelectricpowerenterpriseswilllose.Onthebasisoftheexistingpostperformancesalarymechanism,ChinesepowerenterprisesneedtooptimizetheincentivemechanismofR&Dstaff,toarousetheR&Dstaff’senthusiasmandcreativity,toadapttothenewmarketcompetitionandfurtherimprovemarketvalue.WhilsttheincentivemechanismoptimizingprocessingneedstoconsidernotonlythechangingmarketenvironmentbutalsothepersonalandworkingcharacteristicsofR&Dstaff.ThispapersummarizesthecharacteristicsofthecurrentChinesepowerenterprises’R&Dstaff:staff’stheoryqualityishigh,butinsensitivetothemarket;theyareconfrontedwithheavyworkloadanddiversifiedjobchoices;managerscanobservetheirbehaviorchoicesornot;besides,theprocessofR&DiscomplexandthemarketreactionsofR&Dachievementsareuncertain.Basedonthepremiseoftheabovefeatures,twoincentivemodelsareestablishedinthispaperfromthepointofviewofenterprisemanagers.Oneisforthesituationwhenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescanbeobserved;theotherisforthesituationwhenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescannotbeobserved.Throughsolvingthemodel,weanalyzetheoptimizationpathofelectricpowerenterprisesR&Dstaffincentivemechanismundertheseconditions:(1)whenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescanbeobserved,managerscanpaymoretotheR&Dstaffwhodevelopproductswithhigheroutputvalue,inordertoencouragethemtoworkharder.(2)whenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescannotbeobserved,managersshouldtakereasonablestrategiesaccordingtothedifferentsituations:a.whenR&DstaffincentivetotallydependonthemarketvalueoftheR&Dachievements,managersshouldallocateworkloadrationallyaccordingtotheirdifferenttechnicallevels;b.whenthemarketreactionsofR&Dresultsbecomemoreprecarious,managersneedtoreducetheincentiveintensitywhichbasedonthemarketvalueandraisetheirfixe
简介:Inrecentyears,Chinahaspromulgatedmanylawsandregulationsofenvironmentalprotection,graduallyforminganenvironmentalregulationsystem,andmostenterprisesareunderthedualpressureofenvironmentalprotectionandbusinessperformance.ItwouldbeasignificantwaythatenterprisesundertakeR&Dactivitiesforachange.ThispaperisbasedontheShanghaiandShenzhenA-sharelistedheavypollutionenterprisesin2011-2016,whichisbasedonthereviewandsummaryofresearchresultsofformerresearchers,combiningwithcurrentenvironmentalregulationsituationofourcountry,raisingtherelevanthypothesisbetweenenvironmentalregulations,R&Dinvestmentandbusinessperformanceagainstheavypollutionindustry.Adoptingthemethodofempiricalresearch,italsobuiltthelinearregressionmodelwhichemploystherelevantfinancialdataofheavy-pollutingenterprisesinChinaasthestatisticalresearchsample.Therelationshipforheavy-pollutingenterprisesaffectedbyenvironmentalregulationsbetweenenvironmentalprotectionR&Dinvestmentandenterprisebusinessperformancewastested.TheresultsshowthatthereisapositiveinfluenceontheenvironmentalR&Dinvestmentandbusinessperformance,andalageffectupontheR&Dinvestmentofenterprisestobusinessperformance.Finally,theresearchresultswereusedtoevaluatesproblemsexistingintheR&DinvestmentonpollutionindustryinChinaaswellasbusinessperformanceandweputforwardsomesuggestionsonimprovingenvironmentalregulationstandardsandtechnologyinnovationconsciousnessaswellasoptimizingthestructureofR&Dinvestment.