简介:Weinthispaperexaminewarrantystrategyinatwo-stagesupplychainconsistingofamanufacturerandtwocompetingretailers.Themanufacturerproducestwosubstituteproductsandmarketsthemthroughthetworetailerstoagroupofconsumers,respectively.Foreachtypeofproducts,themanufacturer’sbasewarrantyandaretailer’sextendedwarrantyarebundledwiththeproduct.Weusegametheoreticmodelstoexploretheinteractionsbetweenthetwotypesofwarrantiesandthecompetitionbetweentheretailers.Forthispurpose,twoscenariosareconsidered:noretailerandboththetworetailersprovidingtheextendedwarranties,respectively.Ineachscenario,themanufacturer’sbasewarrantiesareassumedtobeoffered.Ourresultsshowthatwhentheretailersoffertheirextendedwarranties,themanufacturerhasnoincentivetoofferthebasewarranties;otherwise,themanufacturerhastoprovidethebasewarranties.Thecompetitionbetweenretailersintermsoftheproductsubstitutabilityhasnoimpactonwarrantydecisions,butaffectsallplayers’profitsinthesupplychain.Themanufacturercanprovidealongerwarrantylengthandhighercustomerwelfaretoacustomerthantheretailersdo,ifitismoreefficientthantheretailersinwarrantycost-efficiency,andviceversa.